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	<title>Comments on: Praising the Grauniad!</title>
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	<description>We are the best. &#169; &#8482; &#174;</description>
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		<title>By: irdial</title>
		<link>http://irdial.com/blogdial/?p=513&#038;cpage=1#comment-975</link>
		<dc:creator>irdial</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 01 Nov 2006 17:39:41 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>And that is why they want this information and that is the justification they will give for breaking these imaginary seals.

Now, in a perfect scenario, if you were tempted to roll out a system like this, first of all, you would give each &#039;customer&#039; the choice of wether they wanted their data on the spine or not. Then, each &#039;consumer&#039; is issued with a card that contains their  gpg public key, which needs a pass-phrase to unlock any part of their medical records. That means that HMG can have all your data on the spine, but its useless unless the cardholder has swiped and unencrypted the &#039;irdial envelope&#039;. It means that HMG is reduced to being a data storage body, and YOU the patient customer has control of who gets to read your stuff, since its encrypted to your private key.

If you lose your key, your records are toast. This is the only way we can have a project like this silly Spine and retain absolute privacy. If your records are encrypted with a safety key so they can be unlocked in an emergency, then they are not private at all, since this system is open to abuse. If you are forced to escrow your private key and pass-phrase, the system is insecure, since these escrowed keys can be used &#039;behind your back&#039; to get at your stuff.

The fact is that there are many ways a &#039;Spine&#039; like this could be used to increase efficiency without compromising privacy, but the fact is that this system was &lt;i&gt;designed with the intention of being a privacy violating instrument&lt;/i&gt;.

We all know that it is far more efficient for each GP office to be kitted out with off the shelf hardware running standards compliant open source software with record keeping in non proprietary formats, interchangeable via XML. That way, the networked, non centralized way, everyone benefits and no one is allowed mass unmonitored access.

Let me show you how it works.

If you are sick and are being sent to the hospital, your GP simply gives access to your records to the person who is in charge of you at the hospital. She logs into your GP office network over the internet and can see your records. When your operation is over, your GP block access to your records again, which is the default setting for her office and all offices up and down the country.

That is a clean, hygienic way to control patient records; in a distributed, case by case basis where access is granted manually, and only where needed. It makes leaking information traceable. It puts the onus on your GP. You know who and why your medical records are being accessed. You can control your records with the assistance of your doctor.

And its cheaper to roll out, and is more likely to actually work.

This mass agglomeration that HMG is obsessed with is brain dead, uncreative, vendor driven and simply &lt;b&gt;inSaNe&lt;/b&gt;.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>And that is why they want this information and that is the justification they will give for breaking these imaginary seals.</p>
<p>Now, in a perfect scenario, if you were tempted to roll out a system like this, first of all, you would give each &#8216;customer&#8217; the choice of wether they wanted their data on the spine or not. Then, each &#8216;consumer&#8217; is issued with a card that contains their  gpg public key, which needs a pass-phrase to unlock any part of their medical records. That means that HMG can have all your data on the spine, but its useless unless the cardholder has swiped and unencrypted the &#8216;irdial envelope&#8217;. It means that HMG is reduced to being a data storage body, and YOU the patient customer has control of who gets to read your stuff, since its encrypted to your private key.</p>
<p>If you lose your key, your records are toast. This is the only way we can have a project like this silly Spine and retain absolute privacy. If your records are encrypted with a safety key so they can be unlocked in an emergency, then they are not private at all, since this system is open to abuse. If you are forced to escrow your private key and pass-phrase, the system is insecure, since these escrowed keys can be used &#8216;behind your back&#8217; to get at your stuff.</p>
<p>The fact is that there are many ways a &#8216;Spine&#8217; like this could be used to increase efficiency without compromising privacy, but the fact is that this system was <i>designed with the intention of being a privacy violating instrument</i>.</p>
<p>We all know that it is far more efficient for each GP office to be kitted out with off the shelf hardware running standards compliant open source software with record keeping in non proprietary formats, interchangeable via XML. That way, the networked, non centralized way, everyone benefits and no one is allowed mass unmonitored access.</p>
<p>Let me show you how it works.</p>
<p>If you are sick and are being sent to the hospital, your GP simply gives access to your records to the person who is in charge of you at the hospital. She logs into your GP office network over the internet and can see your records. When your operation is over, your GP block access to your records again, which is the default setting for her office and all offices up and down the country.</p>
<p>That is a clean, hygienic way to control patient records; in a distributed, case by case basis where access is granted manually, and only where needed. It makes leaking information traceable. It puts the onus on your GP. You know who and why your medical records are being accessed. You can control your records with the assistance of your doctor.</p>
<p>And its cheaper to roll out, and is more likely to actually work.</p>
<p>This mass agglomeration that HMG is obsessed with is brain dead, uncreative, vendor driven and simply <b>inSaNe</b>.</p>
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		<title>By: Alun</title>
		<link>http://irdial.com/blogdial/?p=513&#038;cpage=1#comment-974</link>
		<dc:creator>Alun</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 01 Nov 2006 15:29:49 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Vaccination records...

These statistics are available on a gross population level. No personal details needed. Whether YOU personally are vaccinated and against what is your business.

With this database information available, your kids may be refused entry to nursery/school if you haven&#039;t made them have the jabs. For example.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Vaccination records&#8230;</p>
<p>These statistics are available on a gross population level. No personal details needed. Whether YOU personally are vaccinated and against what is your business.</p>
<p>With this database information available, your kids may be refused entry to nursery/school if you haven&#8217;t made them have the jabs. For example.</p>
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		<title>By: irdial</title>
		<link>http://irdial.com/blogdial/?p=513&#038;cpage=1#comment-973</link>
		<dc:creator>irdial</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 01 Nov 2006 14:29:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://irdial.com/blogdial/?p=513#comment-973</guid>
		<description>&quot;What interest ‘the public’ could have in your personal medical data is beyond me&quot;

Vaccination records being pertinent to public health?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;What interest ‘the public’ could have in your personal medical data is beyond me&#8221;</p>
<p>Vaccination records being pertinent to public health?</p>
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