Pretexts to Justify Us Military Intervention in Iran: the leaked memorandum

September 29th, 2006


(Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order. Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are intended to provide a point of departure for the development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably to the objective of adequate justification for US military attack on Iran).

1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for US military attack in Iran a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c, could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Iranian reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Iranians of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to attack if Iranian response justifies.

2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around The Persian Gulf to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Iranian forces.

a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order):

(1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.

(2) Land friendly Iranians in uniform “over-the-fence” to stage attack on Iraq.

(3) Capture Iranian (friendly) saboteurs inside Iraq.

(4) Start riots in Tehran (friendly Iranians).

(5) Blow up ammunition inside Umm Qasr; start fires.

(6) Burn aircraft in Iraq airport (sabotage).

(7) Lob mortar shells into Iraqi Mosques. Some damage to Mosques.

(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Bagdad.

(9) Capture militia group which storms Basra.

(10) Sabotage ships in harbors; large fires — napthalene.

(11) Sink ships near harbor entrances. Conduct funerals for mock-victims (may be lieu of (10)).

b. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements and Nuclear installations which ‘threaten Israel’.

c. Commence large scale United States military operations.

3. A “Remember the Maine” incident could be arranged in several forms:

a. We could blow up a US ship in the vicinity of Doha and blame Iran.

b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Persian Gulf. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Iranian attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Iranian planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was under attack. The nearness to Kuwait or Bahrain would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to “evacuate” remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.

4. We could develop a Islamist Iranian terror campaign in the Abu Dhabi area, in other Gulf cities and even in Riyadh.

The terror campaign could be pointed at Iranian refugees seeking haven in the U.A.E.. We could sink a boatload of Iranians enroute to Abu Dhabi (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Iranian refugees in the U.A.E even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Iranian agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Iranian involvement also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.

5. A “Iranian-based, Ahmednejad-supported” filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Gulf nation (in the vein of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We know that Ahmednejad is backing subversive efforts clandestinely against the USA in Iraq, Afganistan, Pakistan, and Lebanon at present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the Iraqi Air Force to intrusions within their national air space. “Iranian” Saegheh Fighter Jet aircraft could make raids at night. Iranian incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with “Iranian” messages to the Al Qaeda in Iraq and “Iranian” shipments of arms which could be found, or intercepted, on the beach.

6. Use of F-5 aircraft by US pilots could provide additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft by F-5 type planes would be useful as complementary actions. An F-5 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Iranian Saegheh, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent in modifying and deploying an out of service F-5 aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the Saegheh could be produced from US resources in about three months.

7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Iran. Concurrently, genuine defections of Iranian civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.

8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Iranian aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner enroute from the anywhere to U.A.E, Iraq, Kuwait or Quatar. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross near Iran. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled flight.

a. An aircraft at an Iraq AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Iraq theatre. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone.

b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Baghdad. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at the Iraq AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When near Iran the drone will being transmitting on the international distress frequency a “MAY DAY” message stating he is under attack by Iranian Saegheh aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio stations in the Persian Gulf to tell the US what has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to “sell” the incident.

9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Islamic Iranian Saeghehs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack.

a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-16 aircraft will be dispatched in trail from Iraqi AFB to the vicinity of Iran. Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Iraq. These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Iranian coast; however, they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the Iranian Saeghehs.

b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft. While near the Iranian coast this pilot would broadcast that he had been jumped by Saeghehs and was going down. No other calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base in Iraq. The aircraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business. The pilot and aircraft would then have disappeared.

c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft would disburse F-16 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Iranian coast and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched and parts of aircraft found.


PDF of this dastardly plan

Now we know what to look for. Of course, we also have the alternative plans not included in this document, that involve ‘gaming’ the United Nations. I will leave it to you to figure out how that works.

One Response to “Pretexts to Justify Us Military Intervention in Iran: the leaked memorandum”

  1. meaumeau Says:


    You know it’s the truth!

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