U.N. rapporteur raps Britains’s law on fingerprinting foreigners
BC-UH-Britain-Racism
By Sara Sasaki

LONDON. July 18 – A special U.N. rapporteur on racism on Thursday criticized Britain’s new immigration legislation on fingerprinting and photographing all foreign visitors as a process 0f treating foreigners like criminals.

Ooudou Diene. on his last day of a six-day visit to Britain to conduct a follow-up of his report on racism, said at a press conference in London the immigration bill that just passed through Parliament on Wednesday “illustrates something I have been denouncing in my reports for four years.”

“It is the fact that, especially since Sept. 11. there has been a process of criminalization of foreigners” all over the world, he added.

The enacted legislation will allow immigration officials to take biometric data from foreigners age 16 and above as pari of measures to light terrorism, enabling them to check for past deportees and anyone designated as a terrorist by the justice minister.

But Diene warned that the fight against terrorism is being used against foreigners worldwide and governments are criminalizing them when they are actually supposed to protect them.

The measures of the new legislation exclude ethnic Irish and other permanent residents with special status, those under 16, those visiting Britain for diplomatic or official purposes, and those invited by the state.

But foreigners living in Britain without special permanent residence status such as those on a work visa will also be fingerprinted and photographed at immigration upon arrival.

Alter his visit t to Britain last July, Diene said racial discrimination in Britain is “deep and profound,” and expressed concerns over the treatment of Scottish indigenous people, Muslim and Hindu minorities living in Britain and new immigrants originating from Asia, the Middle East Africa.

[…]

http://www.debito.org/kyodo051806.jpg
http://www.debito.org/rapporteur.html

The visa applications of more than 100,000 people applying to enter the UK were left unprotected and open to manipulation, according to an official report into one of the biggest privacy breaches in recent history.

There are so many things we could do with this article, the first one being substitution for ContactPoint. But I think you get the message.

There are fears that some of the applications may have been doctored to allow terrorists and criminals to enter the UK. GCHQ, the government intelligence agency charged with tracing the applications, is finding it difficult to investigate the claims because of poor quality records.

This is bullshit. There are already enough ‘terrorists’ in the UK by their own reckoning they do not have to enter here by stealth to cause havoc. This logic is completely flawed. It could also have been used to get people in here who simply want to go to the pub.

Last night, politicians described the security failure as ‘shocking’ and said it fatally undermined the government’s claims that electronic ID systems could protect the UK from the heightened terrorist threat.

And yet these are the same people who voted for ID cards, and ContactPoint. THAT is what is shocking.

The findings of the three-month independent investigation into serious breaches of the the visa application process – focusing on system abuses in India, Nigeria and Russia – were slipped out on the last day of Parliament in an apparent attempt to bury bad news.

They always do this.

Its conclusions raise disturbing questions about Britain’s ability to police its borders.

NO IT DOESNT YOU BLOODY MORON.

What it DOES raise questions about, questions that you do not have the intelligence to pose, is how are they going to police ContactPoint and the proposed NIR if they cannot protect the integrity of a mere 100,000 Visa applications.

Once again, it is astonishing that they are not using cryptography to solve these problems. It is astonishing that the Visa system is so badly designed. It is astonishing that they are using contractors to do this job when it should be done ‘in house’ by civil servants.

The report focuses on a private company, VFS, contracted by the Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to process the online visa applications of Indians wanting to visit Britain. It later won similar contracts in Russia and Nigera.

This is too important, hysteria over immigration and false fear over ‘terrorism’ or not, to be in the hands of a private contractor.

But in 2005 it became apparent that the system was chronically flawed. An applicant informed VFS and UK Visas, the government agency in charge of visa processing, that he was able to obtain confidential information – including passport numbers, criminal convictions, ethnic origin and travel details – about other users of the service. He also showed how he could amend other people’s visa applications online. But despite the warning, the system wasn’t shut down until May 2007.

This is very interesting.

When they say ‘an applicant’ they mean a Nigerian or an Indian or a Russian volunteered this information. I guess all the people trying to get Visas for the UK are not all bad after all!

What this bad article also does not say is that ContactPoint is going to be delivered online also, and that this means that people are going to get in there from anywhere also, and the records of children are going to be accessed.

These Guardian articles routinely fail to connect the dots and make the connections. They really do fail it over and over again.

The official report into the security lapse concludes that the government’s National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre – the former body charged with evaluating the security of IT projects – would have not approved the scheme if it had been asked.

This is irrelevant. The system of issuing Visas can be made infallible and secure and much more simple than it is now. If you have ever seen the absurd spectacle of Immigration officers with loupes inspecting Visas for forgeries at Heathrow you know what I am talking about.

This is how you might do it.

Firstly, Visas must be issued correctly. They must be issued with all the checks that they have been using historically to good effect.

Then, when the Visa is issued the visa number and an image of the Visa and its ‘owner’ are hashed together with GPG an this package is put on an immigration server that is accessible over the internets. When the person who has the visa arrives at Heathrow, all the operator has to do is check that the visa on the system is the one stuck in the passport. He checks to see if the entry has been tampered by checking the signature on the file. If someone got in there and swapped information or altered it, the signature will fail. This means that even if someone gets into the system, they cannot change entries because changing them breaks them; they become tamper proof.

After this, you will never again see people inspecting Visas for forgeries because they will be impossible to make. The only forged Visas in the system will be the ones put there by the ‘security services’…but that is another story.

This is a similar process to the Meau² named ISLAND decentralized passport authentication system. It is inexpensive, fool proof (even when it is being operated by fools) and can be done right now.

The report notes that FCO IT security advisers were not asked their opinion about the project and that no third party tests were carried out on the system. The Conservative shadow Foreign Office Minister, David Lidington, said he feared the system may have been exploited by terrorists and criminals.

[…]

Guardian

David Liddington is clearly a moron.

Shadow Home Affairs Minister, James Brokenshire MP, has today called for an urgent review of safeguards to protect against ID fraud in the wake of the increasing use by clubs and bars of computer scanning equipment to check age information.

The new products are being marketed to pubs, clubs and entertainment outlets to improve their compliance with licensing requirements on under-age drinking. But large quantities of other personal details are also being downloaded at the same time. The equipment works by taking data from driving licences and other forms of ID when they are swiped through the machine by door staff. This includes home address details, date of birth information and even a personal photograph. These details are then stored for potential marketing and other uses and can be printed out, burned onto CD or emailed.

[…]

“This issue is just a small foretaste of the sort of problems that would arise if a national ID card were ever introduced.”

Not the front page of the Metro anymore.

As regular readers will know the databases comprising the NIR system (and linked to ID cards) are being designed to allow access by third party companies such as the marketing companies mentioned. The ‘problems that would arise’ are being built into the system with full knowledge of the implications; no one in their right mind can fail to see the lack of integrity.

—

Yes – Metro – my brain feels as dirty as my fingertips.

He knew about it from the beginning:

I am not sure if this is still the case, but certainly a year or two ago among the plans for the new Terminal 5 at Heathrow was an elaborate and supremely high-tech tracking system for passengers.

The architect from the Richard Rogers partnership told me about it with a gleam in his eye. It was difficult not to feel caught up in his enthusiasm. It worked like this: the terminal, a highly evolved amalgam of building, computer and machine, would know about you before you arrived.

When you had bought your ticket, an image taken from your passport would already have entered its systems. As you arrived, flustered and anxious in the way only airports can make you, Terminal 5 would look at you through its myriad cameras, compare your face with the large number of faces on its database, measure and recognise you – the word “biometric” was not yet common currency at the time – and then, even through the fluster, know you for who you were.

[…]

The Telegraph – from 2003

What follows is a good article of the type we have all read many times.

What this article, sent to me by email, proves, is that Richard Rogers knew from the beginning that dehumanizing fingerprinting and photographing tools were to be used to corral passengers at Terminal 5. That firm was not only complicit in this shameful place, but enthusiastic about it.

Instead of using the design of the building to segregate passengers and do the work of keeping immigration rules in place, they deliberately broke the design of the building to facilitate an experiment in managing crowds through Orwellian identity documents.

Berthold Konrad Hermann Albert Speer immediately comes to mind; an architect whose work served to promote and enshrine the bad guys of his time. Now Richard Rogers can be classed with him; this Terminal was designed to promote boost and brainwash the people who pass through it into accepting the police state system of ID cards, universal surveillance and everything decent people loathe.

This building might not be destroyed as some of Germany’s buildings were after the war. They might however have their design flaws fixed by refurbishing so that the building does what it is meant to do, as all other airports have done very successfully, without violating the very people they are meant to serve.

This article says:

Five’s beautiful alertness and responsiveness will transform the experience of an airport, or so the liberal, civilised, imaginative architect maintained, from a horrible, authoritarian, mass experience into something subtler, gentler, more individual and more pleasant.

This is, of course, doubletalk.

What it actually means is this:

“The vile ever-present eye of complete surveillance will transform the experience of an airport, as designed by the illiberal, uncivilized and unimaginative architects Richard Rogers. What they are planning is horrible, authoritarian mass humiliation and subjugation that obvious and brutal in its reduction of the individual into mere numbered cattle. Very unpleasant.”

When people like Richard Rogers, who really should know better, actively design to encourage and foster authoritarian systems it makes it hard to explain to the ‘the busy people’ why these systems are so wrong. They cannot separate the private from the public, the voluntary from the compulsory; they see only the surface, and as it looks the same, they accept both as being equal when they are not.

What is so wrong about this is that there is a better way to control passenger flow, and this layer of Security Theatre is superfluous and unnecessary; it is inefficient, onerous, pointless and frankly, evil.

There is nothing worse than an arrogant architect. I do not like to use the word ‘arrogant’, and very rarely employ it, but in this case it is completely appropriate.

This man is deliberately using human beings as part of an experiment, and he has put himself and his ideas above the rights and dignity of of the people who his buildings should be protecting and serving.

It is very rare that a building is designed to violate and humiliate the people who use it, and that this is being done in a context where millions will be systematically violated puts Richard Rogers up there with some of history’s worst ‘professionals who misused their art’.

Thanks to Dare to know:

The ContactPoint regulations slipped through the House of Lords on Wednesday 18th, despite resistance from a number of sources, including ARCH. Hansard has the full story.

Look at some of the evidence supplied to the House of Lords. Firstly, from Carpgemini the contractor:

* Up to 330,000 registered users.
* Database will contain records of all 11 million children in England.
* Approximately 200,000 enquiries per day, peaking at about 50 transactions per second.
* Average response times of 1 second for a keyed enquiry.
* 99.9% availability for 24 hours a day, 7 days per week.

That is a lot of accesses. It means that one million accesses per week will be made, and that the entire ContactPoint database will be copied in not less than 11 weeks.

and the nspcc chimes in with something completely illogical:

2. Paragraph 4(1)(a) refers to a child “who at that time is ordinarily resident in England.” We are concerned about how local authorities will interpret “ordinarily resident’ as it could result in particularly vulnerable children being excluded from Contact Point. We have previously raised this matter with the DfES, as neither the draft regulations nor the draft guidance gives a clear interpretation of this. The potential consequence of this is that vulnerable groups of children could be left outside the remit of Contact Point. For example, adults may present children as only being temporarily in the country, as in the case of Victoria Climbié. These children may in fact be trafficked, privately fostered or sent to this country to work and are arguably some of the most vulnerable – because they are often invisible – children in the country.

3. We would suggest that the DfES review this regulation as a matter of urgency. We would propose that the definition used in the Children Act 1989 under section 47(1) (a) “Where a local authority are informed that a child who lives, or is found, in their area” is a better guide for local authorities. In our view it would be better inappropriately to include a child on Contact Point and remove them at a later date than not to include them at all.

Retention of information – Regulation 7

4. We have previously raised concerns in relation to Regulation 7. If it is intended to archive information until the age of 24 years then this should be with the consent of the person concerned when they attain the age of 18 years. Although the information is archived, this measure arguably extends the database well into adulthood. It raises serious concerns about the privacy and confidentiality of information about a person’s childhood. This is possibly one issue which children and young people and parents have not sufficiently been consulted about.

My emphasis.

So, they want people innapropriately put into this monstrosity? Obviously they have no idea about databases and that in order for them to be really useful, they have to be accurate.

They say that, “It raises serious concerns about the privacy and confidentiality of information about a person’s childhood”. Why should this be of concern to someone only when they are 24? What about the concern of the parents?

Not very clear thinkers these people.

But there was someone with their brain switched to ‘on’:

Memorandum by the Young NCB (Young National Children’s Bureau)

1.  Young NCB, the young people’s membership network run by NCB, have submitted a set of comments on ContactPoint which the organisation has gathered from young people previously involved in DfES’ consultation processes on the scheme. Those concerned are all aged under 18.

Do you think that ContactPoint will adequately achieve its aim of “supporting more effective prevention and early intervention, to ensure that children get the additional services they need as early as possible”? If so, can you say what you think the benefits of ContactPoint are? If not, can you explain any reservations that you may have?

2.  I think it is possible in some cases ContactPoint will lead to earlier intervention, but I think the benefits are completely outweighed by the risks. The irony is that the people this system aims to help, those in danger of abuse, may not even be on the system if they don’t have a school or a doctor in which case they will still slip under the net.

3.  I think that ContactPoint will only achieve its aim if thorough and extensive training is given to all professionals using the system. If everyone concerned does not use and understand the system, it will fail. I think that to a certain extent ContactPoint will help, since it should encourage information-sharing and more contact between professionals.

Do you think that the interests of children, young people and families have been adequately taken into account in the proposals for ContactPoint? Can you give reasons for your answer?

4.  No, hardly anyone knows about ContactPoint, probably because the government are aware of what would happen if people did find out, i.e. a huge backlash and public outcry. They’ve spoken to about 15 people and when I worked with them I found them patronizing and unhelpful, they’ve clearly made up their mind regardless of what we think.

5.  The fact that children may refuse to allow their details to be on the index, but that this may be overridden suggests that this notion of a child’s ‘consent’ is practically meaningless. What is even more worrying is that young people will ‘not necessarily’ be told if their wish has been overridden.

6.  I am also not convinced about the security measures in place to stop the system being abused. Computer systems are never, ever completely safe; the threat of hacking is always there. Plus there is always the danger that a professional might use the system to gain personal details about a child or children. It would only need one or two instances of child abuse resulting from exploitation of the system being splashed all over the media for the public’s confidence (and most importantly young people’s and families’ confidence) in ContactPoint to be destroyed. It is worth thinking about whether this risk is greater than the potential benefit gained from the system. I think that extremely harsh penalties for abusing ContactPoint would need to be in place to help stop this happening, but even that could not be wholly successful.

7.  I am also worried that young people’s personal liberty will be hugely undermined by this system. Dozens of people in their local area – perhaps more – will be able to access personal details and, possibly, very sensitive information about them.

8.  I also do not think that a wide-ranging enough consultation has been carried out for ContactPoint. The huge majority of children and young people have absolutely no idea about the proposal, and so when ContactPoint arrives they will have no time to voice their concerns.

If you have other comments to offer, feel free to do so.

9.  The flaw in this system is not the system itself rather human nature, in that with access to this system people can make all sorts of harmful assumptions, particularly when people are ‘flagged’ or seen to be using sensitive services. The other big worry is that knowing people will potentially have access to this information will stop people using sensitive services, and considering we have the highest teenage pregnancy rate in Europe and binge drinking is on the rise that’s not a risk we can afford to run. The system is too big to be safe, too many people have access to private information and children’s right to privacy is being completely disregarded, a very dangerous situation to be in.

Ah yes, intelligence!

Another group that bought a clue:

Security of data:

27. ContactPoint is a national database partitioned into local authority areas. Although the regulations will specify the categories of practitioner to be granted access, the final decision as to who may do so will be left to local authorities. The government expects that around 330,000 people will have access to ContactPoint.

28. It is impossible to create a system on this scale that is both functional and secure. The government tacitly acknowledges this by advancing an intention that the records of celebrity children and those who are, for example, escaping domestic violence will not appear on ContactPoint. Nonetheless, the government insists that the system will be secure and points to the fact that everyone with access will undergo CRB checks; access will be by two-factor authentication and an audit system will detect improper access.

29. Criminal record checks have limited value. Within the education and social care sectors, increasing numbers of staff are from overseas and it is not possible to check their histories beyond, at most, obtaining information as to whether they have criminal convictions. Schools are advised that:

‘If attempts have been made to make checks (through obtaining a Certificate of Good Conduct or similar) but it has not been possible then the school is not required to take further action.’ [31]

At best, CRB checks detect known criminals but it is well known that paedophiles have usually committed many offences before being caught, if they are caught at all.

30. The Criminal Records Bureau warns:

The CRB cannot currently access overseas criminal records or other relevant information as part of its Disclosure service. If you are to recruit people from overseas and wish to check their overseas criminal record, a CRB Check may not provide a complete picture of their criminal record that may or may not exist.[32]

31. Two-factor authentication does not protect the system from all outside attack, particularly as ContactPoint will be accessed via Internet protocols, nor does it prevent careless disclosure or the unauthorised sharing of login information. Last year The Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust reported a ‘wholesale sharing and passing on of system log-in identifications and passwords’, recording 70,000 cases of inappropriate access to systems, including medical records, in one month.[33]

32. An audit system does not prevent all improper access. The Police National Computer, for example, has a substantial audit resource and yet the Independent Police Complaints Commission comments:

‘Every year sees complaints alleging the unauthorised disclosure of information from the Police National Computer. Forces have reviewed their methods of preventing unlawful entry but there will always be a few officers willing to risk their careers by obtaining data improperly.'[34]

33. Given the scale of what is proposed, it is vital that ContactPoint does not go ahead until Parliament has ensured that all of the security issues are resolved. Indeed, consideration of the regulations will be Parliament’s last opportunity to ensure that ContactPoint does not in fact endanger children and their families.

34. ContactPoint is not essential. The traditional method of finding out who else knows a child is to ask the child or parents. If professionals are competent and ensure that families have their contact details, this system works well (unless there are genuine child protection concerns). It also leaves control of personal information with parents and children in accordance with their Article 8 rights to respect for their private and family life and freedom from unnecessary state interference.

And finally, the a last gasp of common sense from The Lords:

The Government intend to use the system to improve the care of and provision for children. Their intentions are of the best kind and are shared in principle by all noble Lords. Yet it is the very system that they seek to rely on that risks stigmatising children and discouraging them from seeking help where necessary.

The Minister said that the regulations had the backing of many children’s welfare organisations. However, the majority of young people and parents consulted by the DCFS oppose the measures, and the major children’s charities—the NCB, the NSPCC, Action on Rights for Children and a coalition led by BAAF—have voiced serious objections. Noble Lords will have received the excellent briefing from the Independent Schools Council.The ContactPoint system, we are told, is intended to prevent another Victoria Climbié situation. However, that is not quite accurate. The agenda for the collection of children’s data began with the programme originally called “identification, referral and tracing”, which predates the Laming inquiry and does not mention child protection in its original criteria. Moreover, the child protection specialist Chris Mills has already ascertained that the system would not have applied to Victoria Climbié, given her temporary residency in this country.

We all wish to see an end to the horrors that befell Victoria Climbié and others. Inasmuch as the system will create a culture of over-reliance on what will always be a flawed database, it would divert attention from the children who most need protection from those who profess to care for them. It appears that the children of the rich and famous may be exempted if there is a risk of kidnap. While I fully understand why that should be the case, it strikes me as the most damning admission of the inability of the system to protect the details of children, not to mention the injustice of treating one set of children differently from the rest.

Indeed. My emphasis…. and yet, it passed.

[…]

http://www.publications.parliament.uk

Reading through all of the submissions makes ContactPoint seem like even more of a nightmare, if that is possible. Because people are so very stupid.

The response from Barnardo’s is astonishing in its complete lack of any real understanding about this system and what it will really do and the real issues swarming around it:

8. The trailblazer authorities and DfES have consulted with children and families, particular on matters such as confidentiality and security. Barnardo’s experience within the trailblazer project was that young people want to be able to access services when they need them and they make a connection between this and information sharing; we found this particularly in cases of young people with disability, where they did not want to tell their story over and over again.

9. ContactPoint will contain no case data, simply demographics to help practitioners verify that they are working with the same person. It will be up to practitioners (as is the case now) to decide what they can share, with whom and how much. Again, work in the trailblazers (Sheffield in particular) illustrated that young people are happy for their information to be shared where they and their needs are respected and where information is shared appropriately for purposes which they understand.

So they don’t want to tell their story again and again, yet the DB will not hold these stories. Amazing.

What also shocks me is the fact that children were consulted about something that is beyond their capacity to fully understand and that will have consequences not only for them both as children and into their adulthood, but for their parents and the next generation of children. Every aspect about consulting children over ContactPoint is wrong; the only people who should have been consulted are parents, since ContactPoint will hold the data of people who are not legally responsible for themselves.

Perhaps ‘consulted’ is not what they really mean; its more likely that they ran some focus groups to see what the reactions were.

I am amazed that organizations dedicated to protecting children are FOR contact point; they must be amongst the most delusional people out there, and their total disregard for human rights is breathtaking. These people act like children are created in hatcheries and are a form of state property, without parents, families or any rights.

What a terrible business!

Capgemini (Euronext: CAP) is a major French company, one of the world’s largest information technology, consulting, outsourcing and professional services companies with a staff of 75,000 operating in 30 countries. It is headquartered in Paris (Rue de Tilsitt) and was founded in 1967 by Serge Kampf, the current chairman. CEO Paul Hermelin has led the company since his appointment in December 2001.

Capgemini’s regional operations include North America, Northern Europe & Asia Pacific and Central & Southern Europe. Services are delivered through four disciplines for Consulting, Technology, Outsourcing and Local Professional Services. The latter is delivered through Sogeti, a wholly owned subsidiary.

Wikipedia

So that is who got the contract to build ContactPoint.

The children of Britain sold to a French company that operates n 30 countries.

The database set to contain information and carers’ contact details for every child in England will cost £41 million (US$84 million) a year to run on top of its £224 million implementation costs, the government has admitted.

Capgemini was awarded the £40 million, seven-year contract to set up and manage the ContactPoint database and online directory earlier this week.

But children’s minister Kevin Brennan has revealed that the ongoing costs of the database — accessible to more than 330,000 education, health, social care and youth justice professionals — will dwarf the contract price.

ContactPoint will contain basic identifying information about all children in England from birth until age 18, along with contact details for their parents or carers and for professionals providing support services to them.

Brennan confirmed that the total costs of implementing the system are estimated at £224 million, with £28.4 million already spent on the project in 2006-07 and a further £11.2 million in the first three months of 2007-08.

The implementation costs include the price of adapting the government IT systems that will supply the data and the adapting of systems used by professionals working with children so they can access ContactPoint, Brennan said in a parliamentary written answer. It also includes the cost of ensuring security and data accuracy, along with staff training.

“Running costs thereafter are estimated to be £41 million per year. Most of this will go directly to local authorities to fund staff to ensure the ongoing security, accuracy and audit of ContactPoint,” Brennan said in response to questions from shadow children’s minister Tim Loughton.

By the end of next year, ContactPoint is expected to be available to all English local authorities, child protection agencies and a group of children’s charities.

An initial deployment will roll out the database to 17 early adopter authorities and Barnardo’s in April. “Progress towards readiness to receive access to ContactPoint is on track” among local authorities, Brennan said.

[…]

http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,134926-c,kidsteens/article.html

So, ContactPoint will cost:

224,000,000 / 11,900,000 = £18.82 per child

and then

41,000,000 / 11,900,000 = £3.46 per child per year

What a bargain!

Of course, this is not what these numbers really mean. What they really say is this is the price that HMG puts on the heads of every child in this country when they come to sell them to the highest (or lowest) bidder to be fleeced en masse.

That this database will violate children is beyond dispute. What is astonishing is that ContactPoint will contain data that is worth far more than £18.82 per head.

Data brokers would pay ten times that amount for the database, because they would be able to sell it again and again and again; and lets remember, this is going to be the closest thing to a complete database of all children and their parents, it will be without precedent, unparalleled.

At least, not for long.

You can find out about how data brokers work by trying to get hold of or buy a list of all the schools in the UK. The dfes has a list, but they are not allowed to sell it to you or give you access to it because doing so would compete with the data brokers that rent these lists commercially. They sell the lists at £100 per thousand entries, and then you do not get to keep the data, you only get to use it for a single purpose.

Imagine how much money ContactPoint will be worth in this case. Once the data escapes ContactPoint, companies will rent it over and over in small parcels, with sets of data sorted by postcode, age single parent or not, you name it. It will be a license to print money, and the junk mail that families will begin to receive will be indistinguishable to the mail-outs that they already get; they wont even realize that they have been ‘ContactPoisoned’.

The only people who will be immune to all of this are the celebrity families and VIP families who will not be in the ContactPoint system “for their own protection”.

Now read this:

A £224m national database of all 11 million children in England, which is being set up in response to the murder of eight-year-old Victoria Climbié, is to be designed by Capgemini.

The national Information Sharing Index is due to be ready by the end of 2008. The database, which will cost £41m per year to operate, will include addresses and telephone numbers for children and their parents – and will enable social services and doctors to share vital information about a child’s health and education across local authorities.

The child database was recommended in a report by Lord Laming after Climbié was killed by her great-aunt despite having been examined by social workers, doctors and police.

The Department for Education and Skills awarded the contract to Capgemini under a long-term agreement between the two organisations which began in 2002 and which is annually benchmarked for value.

A fully-costed design of the technical architecture is due to be completed by the end of this year.

Silicon dot com

My emphasis.

No database will prevent crime. Full stop. The sad story above shows that even when the social services are in full contact the bad stuff still happens. It happens very very rarely, and ContactPoint is no proper response to this.

And finally, a good comment on this story:

Name: Anonymous

Location: Midlands

Occupation: IT Developer

Comment: Lets see now…

Server 2,000
Oracle Lic 1,000
DBA for day 1,000
CapGemini profit 223,996,000
========
Total 224,000,000

That’s how it works, is it?

Right on the money!

Heathrow to check fingerprints

Last Updated: 12:01am BST 21/07/2007

Terminal 5 passengers will have fingers and faces scanned, says Jeremy Skidmore.

Fingerprinting of passengers, a process that has irritated many visitors to the United States, will soon be happening on some domestic flights within Britain.

Domestic passengers departing from Heathrow’s Terminal 5, which opens in March, will have to give a fingerprint and have their faces scanned as part of a security check before take-off. The checks are being brought in because both domestic and international passengers will share a common departure lounge and there are fears that those arriving on international flights may be able to bypass immigration control by booking an onward domestic flight to a regional airport.

This is total insanity.

Firstly, whenever someone gets off a plane, they go straight from the plane to immigration, where they are checked. They should then go to a waiting room that does not physically connect with domestic flight passengers.

The architects that designed Terminal 5 (Richard Rogers Partnership) should be sued for extreme negligence; can you name me a single airport where domestic and international passengers are allowed to freely mingle in a unified departure lounge?

This is one of the biggest design blunders ever in the history of airport design, and now, passengers flying on domestic flights are going to have to submit to fingerprinting just to travel in their own country.

International passengers departing through Terminal 5 will be subject to the normal checks and controls but will not undergo face scans or have to provide a fingerprint. At Gatwick, which also has a shared departure lounge for all passengers, domestic travellers already have their photographs taken.

Did you know this?

A spokeswoman for Terminal 5 said the new fingerprinting systems were a way of taking security to the next level. “At the moment there are no plans for any other passengers to be fingerprinted, but it is the way of the future. We work closely with the Home Office on security issues,” she said.

This is just total bullshit. USVISIT has been a total failure, costing billions only to catch a few people (1500 out of tens of millions of people violated) who have outstanding parking tickets.

From this autumn, those arriving at 10 US airports, including New York JFK, Chicago, Miami and Boston, will have to give fingerprints of all 10 fingers, raising fears of increased delays.

Note how the delays is the only thing concerning this writer.

Bob Mocny, the acting director of the US-Visit Programme, which runs immigration security, said the new technology would improve safety

That is a lie, and it is demonstrated by the figures.

and, eventually, be a fast system. He said the same system would be introduced across Europe in the future.

And from what crystal ball did he glean this information?

However, the Home Office said this week that it has no plans to insist on fingerprints for incoming passengers.

They will not be able to justify it using the USVISIT numbers – they just don’t add up.

“We take fingerprints across 80 different countries from people when they apply for visas and have stopped 4,000 people from coming in,” said a spokeswoman.

That is a totally different scenario. It has nothing to do with fingerprinting EVERYBODY whenever they want to travel.

Recent improvements in security at Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted include the introduction of flat scanners that can read the new biometric indicators in e-passports.

That is not an improvement in security, it is more Security Theatre.

Extra checks on passengers have been introduced following the recent attempted terrorist attacks at airports, leading to fears of increased delays for passengers this summer.

And none of them will be of any use. All of them are Security Theatre.

Telegraph

[…]

I have to say, that this is close to the most absurd and insane thing I have ever read. A firm of architects opts to create a single departure lounge with international and domestic passengers unsegregated, and as a result, to fix the problem, people flying inside their own country have to be fingerprinted like criminals.

This is absolute, complete, cant-make-shit-like-this-up INSANITY.

Architecture should serve the people who have to live work and go through it. By failing to segregate domestic and international passengers, not only has Richard Rogers Partnership failed to consider the dignity of passengers who are going to go through Heathrow Terminal 5, but they have failed to understand the brief.

Security at an airport, at a minimum means ensuring that immigration rules are followed. It means carefully considering the flow of passengers and their status. By failing to implement passenger flow correctly by creating a shared departure lounge, Richard Rogers Partnership has created a building that will not only fail to serve the people who use and pass through it, but which will violate and humiliate millions of people. It will serve as yet another way to soften up the people to the idea of regular fingerprinting for even the most simple of things.

This is one of the greatest architectural disasters ever.

Phishers go after two-factor authentication systems

By Eric Bangeman| Published: July 11, 2006 – 01:49PM CT

One of the problems with passwords is that they can be compromised relatively easily. While brute-force cracks are possible, it is much easier to convince users to willingly part with their passwords using social engineering. That’s how phishers operate, by tricking users into entering their passwords—along with other personal information—on convincing-looking but spoofed web pages. Once they have that information, bank balances shrink while credit card balances grow.

Two-factor authentication has been touted as a solution to the problem of users giving up their passwords too easily. One group of phishers is determined to prove otherwise, as a recent attack demonstrates.

On the surface, two-factor authentication is a relatively simple solution. In order to log in to a protected site, users must enter a password as well as a second bit of information. In the case of Citibank and a handful of other financial institutions, users are given a USB dongle which displays a passphrase or string of numbers that updates every 60 seconds. It is only when the correct password is paired with a valid passphrase generated by the token that the user is granted access to their account information.

A group of phishers operating out of a Russian website attempted to trick Citibank customers in the customary manner, by directing them to a lookalike website and asking for the usual personal information. As an added bonus, the phishers also asked for the passphrase generated by the token. Once they had both pieces of the authentication information, they would presumably then transmit it onto Citibank within a 60-second time period and go about their nefarious business. It’s a simple adaptation of existing methods: just add an additional field to existing forms and they are all set.

The phishing attacks demonstrates one of the weaknesses of two-factor authentication: it’s still quite vulnerable to “middleman” attacks. If a malicious site is able to pose as the genuine article, collect the necessary authentication from the unsuspecting user, and act on it quickly enough, it is not much safer than traditional password-only attacks.

Some banks and other institutions have already made substantial investments in developing and deploying two-factor authentication systems. The central theme in marketing the systems to customers is added security. Microsoft had even planned to natively support it in Vista, although that ultimately met the same fate as other features originally planned for its new OS. However, as the latest bit of phishing demonstrates, it’s not a cure-all. When used in conjunction with other antiphishing tools, it can be more effective. But as long as there are gullible users, no combination of security measures will be completely foolproof.

[…]

ArsTechnica

My emphasis.

As we know, password abuse in the NHS is endemic. Gullible or simply exhausted users will be tricked into revealing their passwords and token numbers, and then ‘Russian Hackers’ (the media’s latest bogeyman) will get in and start to copy ContactPoint entries, i.e. the private and sensitive details of children. This will be automated, so they will have a system to harvest accounts in place that will allow them to quickly create a working copy of the live ContactPoint database.

The US VISIT programme, which is intended to record the entry and exit of every visitor, is still not working nor is there any prospect of it doing so. While most of the the 300 air, sea and land “points of entry” are operating “biometrically enabled” entry records “comparable exit capabilities are not” said a report on the evidence presented to the US House of Representatives by officials from the Government Accountability Office (GAO): Homeland Security: Prospects For Biometric US-VISIT Exit Capability Remain Unclear Over the past 4 years $1.3 billion has been spent on the system.

The report says that:

“The prospects for successfully delivering an operational exit solution are as uncertain today as they were 4 years ago.”

The Department of Homeland Security is committed to providing exit records at air and seaports it has produced no plans or analyses to achieving this and:

“acknowledged that a near-term biometric solution for land POEs is not possible”

Even where biometrically enabled system were available at 11 air and sea pilot schemes:

“on average only about 24 percent of those travellers subject to US-VISIT actually complied with the exit processing steps.”

This was because compliance was “voluntary”.

The biggest long-term problem is the land exit schemes.

“According to program officials, no technology or device currently exists to biometrically verify persons exiting the country that would not have a major impact on land POE facilities. They added that technological advances over the next 5 to 10 years will make it possible to biometrically verify persons exiting the country without major changes to facility infrastructure and without requiring those exiting to stop and/or exit their vehicles.”

Indeed land exit capabilities are “being deferred to an unspecified future time”

The report’s overall conclusion is that:

“there is no reason to expect that DHS’s newly launched efforts to deliver an air and sea exit solution will produce results different from its past efforts—namely, no operational exit solution despite many years and hundreds of millions of dollars of investment. More importantly, the continued absence of an exit capability will hinder DHS’s ability to effectively and efficiently perform its border security and immigration enforcement mission.”

And what of the overall effectiveness of the US VISIT scheme? Last autumn the Acting Director of Homeland Security said that out of 63 million recorded visitors “1,200 criminals and immigration violators” had been denied entry – this report says the figure has risen to 1,500.

[…]

http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/jul/o2usa-goa-exit-report.htm

You
Can’t
Make
Shit
Like
This
Up!

So they are counting people in, but not out? The exit system is VOLUNTARY?!

Look at the HUGE expense just to catch 1,500 people, all of them minor ‘criminals’. Use the Google to find out what we said about this before. This article demonstrates that the VAST MAJORITY of people coming to the usa are not in any way criminal. This means that they should never be treated as criminals. Period.

This is a monumental waste of money, a mass violation of people’s rights, and yet another example of ‘Vendor Hypnosis’. You can work out what that phrase means can’t you?

SHAME SHAME SHAME on the USA!

By DAVID KILLICK
July 13, 2007

HUNDREDS of British ID card holders have been told to cut up their ID cards and replace their fingertips after a security breach in Sweden.

Computer tapes containing ID card holders’ details nationwide were among items in a car stolen from a Swedish data processing company in May.

Many EU financial institutions are affected, but only some are notifying customers.

The National Identity Register has written to ID card holders this week warning them to cancel ID cards and to replace their fingertips.

“Your National Identity Register ID card details may have been compromised on or after May 25, 2007, due to a possible data breach in Sweden,” it says. “As a precaution your ID card needs to be cancelled, your fingerprints replaced and a new ID card issued.”

National Identity Register spokeswoman Marsha Cadman said fewer than 5 per cent of the UK’s 70,000,000 customers were affected.

No instances of fraud had been reported and the NIR was taking a precautionary approach, she said.

“This is not an issue our citizens should be concerned with. It impacted only a small number of citizens.

“Some other EU institutions on the mainland haven’t cancelled ID cards, they’ve just let it go, some of them cancel them immediately.

“We prefer to take the middle ground and say check the ID card, make sure there’s no transactions, and we encourage you to come in and cancel.”

EU commissioner for financial crimes Leanne Vale said there had been no reports the stolen data had been used in crimes.

“It’s a low risk event,” she said. “Our ID card system admins are very prudent and they will always err on the side of caution and will reissue ID cards, and contact ID card holders so they can replace their fingerprints and maintain a high level of interaction with their customers. Other identity institutions may not choose to do that.”

EU ‘ID Czar’ David Bell said banks were aware of the breach and were monitoring customers’ accounts.

NIR spokeswoman Pauline Hayes said ID card holders were not protected against any unauthorised purchases by a zero-liability fraud protection policy.

[…]

News.com

ContactPoint access, according to the Draft Contact Point Guidance – Version 1 (65 pages – PDF 388kb), is going to be granted to authorized users by ‘secure token’, username and password.

They define it as:

Security token – an item or device which provides one of the elements of information required for authentication. Examples include a frequently changing numerical code generator or a single-use numerical sent to your phone.

I have seen one of these random number tokens in use by a director of Chase as he accessed his work account over a dialup telephone line while using his laptop.

They work by using time to synchronize a random pin number on this token, to an authentication server on the system where your account sits. You have to use your user name, password and the random number displayed on your token to gain access. This part of the authentication keeps out people who write scripts to try and brute force accounts.

This is the most expensive version. Obviously if you are going to roll this out to 330,000 people, HMG will be loathe to order all of those tokens at, say $69.50 per user. And since they expire every three years they will all have to be replaced regularly.

See below for what this means. Meanwhile, lets look at the ‘Security Principles’ part of the document:

1.10 Security

Keeping the information on ContactPoint safe and secure and ensuring that it is only accessed by people who have a right to access it is of paramount importance, this too is a requirement of the Data Protection Act. Everyone who uses, administers and manages ContactPoint must act in ways that preserve the security of ContactPoint.

What this actually means is that the 330,000 people who will be given access to ContactPoint will be given the responsibility of keeping the data safe and secure. Since all of these people will be able to access all of the ContactPoint data, it effectively means they all have superuser status to look at everyone’s accounts no matter who they are or where they live. On a UNIX system, only the superuser can look into everyone’s files; individual users can only look at their own files, and in the case of a Local Authority (for example) they should really only be able to look at the details of people who live in their catchment area, if we were to agree to the principle of ContactPoint in the first place. It is insane that all 330,000 users can see every record.

2.1 Security Principles

Security of ContactPoint and the information held on it is of critical importance. Everyone who uses ContactPoint must take all practicable steps to ensure that their actions do not compromise security in any way.

This is crazy. Imagine if your bank allowed its all of its users to access bank details from any computer at any time over the internets. That would be a recipe for disaster, just like ContactPoint is. Banks that take security seriously, only allow access to their network from terminals inside branches, which are private networks. Of course, even if the architects of contact point specified that terminals must be inside secure buildings, that would not make ContactPoint OK because it is a compulsory system that violates your rights.

Some might say that being on this database is no different to being on the database of people who own passports. The difference is that having a passport allows you to travel, entitles you to consular services when you are abroad, and the database is used only to administer the issuing of passwords, etc etc; in other words, you get something out of it. Everyone on ContactPoint gets nothing out of it, in fact, you LOSE your privacy in return for absolutely nothing.

2.2 To ensure that only legitimate users access ContactPoint, a password and a physical security token (see Glossary), are both required to authenticate identity. This is known as 2 factor authentication.

This is better than a username and password, but it does not eliminate the problems associate with databases and the nature of data. The ‘things you must not do with ContactPoint’ bears this out:

2.3 A number of key principles should be observed, as a minimum, by everyone with access to ContactPoint. These are:
• Adhere to any local organisation policy/guidance on IT security;

What does this mean exactly? If you can access it from anywhere, it doesn’t matter WHAT guidelines are given; you are free to break them whenever you like.

• Never share user accounts, passwords or security tokens with others;

This is going to happen. We KNOW it is going to happen. ContactPoint tokens are going to have a monetary value, multiplied by the number of searches you want to do. There cannot be a single person who does not believe that ContactPoint will not be abused from the first day that it goes online…if it goes online.

• Do not write down your password and take care when entering it to ensure your keyboard is not overlooked;

We all know that shoulder surfing is done all the time. If someone is accessing ContactPoint from their laptop, their home computer or anywhere where there are people around, shoulder surfing will happen. As for writing down passwords, if they are going to use secure tokens, writing down a password will not be useful, since the token number changes every minute. Do they really understand what all of this means?

• Keep security token with you or securely locked up;

People are going to keep their ContactPoint security tokens on the keychain that they use for their house. Many of them are sold with metal rings to facilitate this. No one is going to keep their token in a safe or some other such place. Secondly, they have to deliver 330,000 of these tokens to the users. If even one of them goes astray in this distribution process then copies of the entries can be made. It is well known that identity theft and credit card fraud happens because post is stolen in transit.

• Never leave ContactPoint logged in when you leave your desk;

So, if someone has accessed 100 ContactPoint records on their laptop, and it is stolen, and these records are kept in the browsers cache, then those 100 children are compromised. This will happen.

• Ensure any reports or information you print from ContactPoint are stored securely and destroyed when no longer required;

On the first day that ContactPoint goes online, and all the 330,000 tokens have been distributed, a minimum of 330,000 children will have their records accessed. If these are printed out, they have escaped the database and are in the wild. Unless they are going to supply 330,000 secure shredders to all the ContactPoint users, you can guarantee that these printouts will be lost, sold and misused.

• Do not let others read ContactPoint information from your computer screen, particularly if working within a public environment; and

This will happen. Also, machines that are compromised will be turned into copying stations where ContactPoint information leaks into the hands of bad guys. By the way, every time I use the phrase ‘ContactPoint information’, or ‘ContactPoint entries’ or any other such phrase, remember we are talking about the private and sensitive information of children.

• Do not use public terminals (e.g. internet cafes, public reception areas) to access ContactPoint.

This will happen. For sure. And there is no way for ContactPoint admin to know when this has taken place.

2.4 Users It is your responsibility to prevent others from gaining access to, or making use of, your account. You must not share your password or security token with others. If you intentionally facilitate unauthorised access to ContactPoint, it is likely you are committing an offence under the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (see A10). You are likely to be committing an offence under this act if you make unauthorised or inappropriate use of ContactPoint yourself.

None of this will stop abuse of ContactPoint. No sanction will put the data back in the database, or repair the harm done to a child after the fact.

You must keep your password secret and look after your security token. Failure to do so may result in suspension or closure of your ContactPoint account. You may also be subject to your organisation’s disciplinary procedures. If you forget your password or cannot gain access to the system, contact your user account administrator – they will reset your password if appropriate.

If the token is the password, then this is not correct. Is this three factor authentication (username, password and token) or two factor authentication? see the comment below for the precise reason why this paragraph is here, and how it makes ContactPoint and this method of authentication even more insane.

If you think your password may be known to others, or you have lost your security token then you must inform your user account administrator immediately to enable them to take appropriate action. Any access using your password or security token, will register in the audit trail as activity carried out by you.

So all you have to say is that your stuff was stolen for 48 hours as your account is used to trawl through thousands of records. This is unacceptable by any standards, and of course, once the data is out there, it is out there for good. Or evil, as in this case.

2.5 Staff Managers You should ensure that all users you manage are aware of the importance of security, understand good security practice and act in a way which will not compromise ContactPoint. If you suspect a staff member is breaching security, you should contact the ContactPoint Management Team to discuss necessary steps, which may include disciplinary action.

Horse. Stable door. Bolted. Get me?

2.6 ContactPoint Management Team LA and partner organisation user account administrators – You are responsible for administering user accounts and the security arrangement related to user accounts. User accounts and security tokens must only be issued to individuals who meet ContactPoint access requirements (See 2.7).

so the distribution of the tokens is not going to be centralized, but farmed out to LAs and ‘partner organisations’ whatever that means. This gets worse by the line.

Where a user reports the loss of their security token or the possibility that their password may be known by others, you must suspend the user account immediately to prevent any unauthorised access. You can only reactivate a user account after the user has been provided with a new, secure password and/or token as required.

And the data returned to the database.

2.9 The requirement to have an enhanced CRB disclosure which is renewed every three years is specific to ContactPoint and does not replace existing organisational policies for non-ContactPoint users. Individuals who do not have an enhanced CRB disclosure or have one which is more than 3 years old will have to apply for a new disclosure to become ContactPoint user. Applications for enhanced CRB disclosures should be made in sufficient time to receive it before access is needed (or a previous disclosure reaches 3 years). If evidence of a renewal is not received before the 3 year period the user account may be suspended.

MAY be suspended?

3.9 Misuse of ContactPoint

Using ContactPoint for other purposes than to support practitioners in fulfilling specific duties (see 1.6) or in a manner contrary to this guidance is likely to be misuse (see flowchart at B13). For instance, it would not be appropriate for ContactPoint to be used to assess applications for school places, or to pinpoint an adult suspected of tax-evasion. Nor is it appropriate for ContactPoint users to access records of their own children, or those of their colleagues, friends and neighbours, unless they have a legitimate professional relationship as a provider of services to that child.

There is no way for ContactPoint admin to know why a record on a child is being accessed. They are basically trusting that the 330,000 who will have access will not disobey the guidelines. This database is going to be used for everything and you can guarantee that there will be a special class of account that has no audit trail, for use of the ‘security services’ and the police. If anyone thinks that ContactPoint users will not access the records of their own children, they are COMPLETELY INSANE; that is the first thing that every new user will do. They will check to see that their children’s records are not incorrect, then they will check on all of their relatives and friends. This is a perfectly natural reflex reaction to being in front of a system like this, and there is no way that any admin will be able to sift through the tens of millions of log entries to find these ‘abuses’. This system, because it is accessible by 330,000 people will rack up audit trails into the tens of millions within the first two weeks of it being online. It will be impossible to police, and even if they do catch someone looking at the records for their own children, then what? are they going to gaol them for doing so? kick them off of the system? suspend them? fire them? I don’t think so, and of course, once the violation has happened, it cannot be undone.

These are some of the things that will go wrong are wrong with ContactPoint:

Stolen token access
People will have their tokens and usernames and passwords stolen. All it will take is a few minutes to compromise the system and put children in danger.

Reproduced printouts
No matter what arrangements you have to secure access, if the data is on a screen it can be copied and printed. This means that ContactPoint can never be secure, and any child in it is in danger.

Insider breaches
Insiders will leak information from ContactPoint. This has happened in every other government database, and ContactPoint will be no different.

Rich still able to opt out
This proves that ContactPoint is not and cannot ever be secure, and that its users are not trustworthy and can never be trusted. The rich and famous will be able to opt out of ContactPoint. If ContactPoint were secure, there would be no need for this opt out option for the rich.

One insider mega breach is all it takes
All it takes is for one person to leak the database and then it will be out there forever. No matter how secure the access arrangements are, this will always be true.

Tokens for sale: the new money
As I said above, the tokens to access ContactPoint will become a sort of currency. People will sell and rent them to gain access.

Tokens shared over phone in the one minute window
Depending on how it is set up, people will be able to share the random number on the token over the phone. When the session expires, the person selling access can sell a new random number to the scumbag who wants to get access to the data. In this way, the ContactPoint user can keep her token, limit access to her black market data clients and still remain in the system on a long term basis.

Finally, all of this is VERY expensive (expiring tokens needing to be replaced etc), and will not solve the any of the problems associated with child protection; it will in fact cause more problems, and the worst thing about it is, once they decide that ContactPoint is a bad idea, it will be too late; the data will be out there circulating on the black market forever. It will be impossible to shut down or erase. This is the main problem with this idea; it cannot ever be taken back.

Philosophically ContactPoint is indefensible. It usurps the role of the parent, and replaces the parent with the state. No parent should be denied the right to opt out of this system, especially since children of rich will be out of it.

You have every right to remove yourself from this Database, and you should do everything in your power to make sure that you are not put into it.

Note the new category; ‘Post Tipping Point’. This is shorthand for, “we are not going to link back to BLOGDIAL articles on this subject inside this post that you should already have read or should be able to find with the google”.

Here we go….

Watchdog seeks an end to ‘horror’ of personal data security leaks

Business leaders oppose stronger powers to investigate breaches

Phillip Inman
Wednesday July 11, 2007
The Guardian

Phillip Inman; you fail it.

Britain’s data watchdog sparked a row with business leaders yesterday when he called for more powers to confront companies that fail to protect personal information held on computers. He wants a new rule that would allow investigators to look at files without the permission of company directors.

His plans ran into immediate opposition from business leaders who said his request for increased powers were a heavy-handed response to the problem.

The information commissioner, Richard Thomas, said that a “horrifying” succession of data security breaches in recent years at high-profile companies – including mobile phone operator Orange, building society Nationwide and mail order retailer Littlewoods – had shown that many companies failed to understand the risks to their customers and to their own reputations of keeping vast databases without adequate security.

The fact of the matter is that Richard Thomas is a busybody beurocrat twiddling his thumbs in his office while the government puts together ContactPoint, which will be a database delivered over the internets, via browsers (read Internet Exploder) and available to 300,000+ people who will be authenticated by a username and password.

THIS should be his main concern. THIS is where he should be putting his ‘expertise’ to good use; to stop the greatest child protection disaster ever from being rolled out.

Instead, this anti-business Neu Labour aparachick loser wants to punish business, that people engage with voluntarily, for lapses in their security.

How pathetic.

Mr Thomas said giving him the power to conduct an inspection and audit to ensure compliance with data protection laws would allow him “to force the pace” and encourage more companies to change their behaviour. Now, he must gain the consent of an organisation before starting an investigation. He also questioned whether companies should be obliged to report data security breaches in the same way the banks are forced to report suspicious money laundering.

How about government agencies who hold data on citizens involuntarily being forced to submit to independent audits? How about obliging every government agency using a database being obliged to report data security breaches? This is far more important because the databases that the British public are forced into are just that, by force, they make it impossible or very very hard to get yourself removed from the most simple databases.

Did you know that your personal and private medical records are the property of the department of health and that if you want to get your records deleted from any of their systems, you have to have the written permission of the secretary of health to do so?

In the commercial world, where all your stuff is voluntary, you can reduce your data shadow considerably, by following some simple rules. For example, use an alternate name everywhere and anywhere you can. Use a pay as you go mobile phone. All of these things can be done, and you would be surprised at how friendly these companies are when you ask them about deleting your account. Businesses are more responsive to the needs of their customers than the government is, and frankly, Richard Thomas needs to get off of his ass and implement citizen friendly data practices throughout government, like an end to biometric passports, cancellation of ContactPoint, and of course, the complete cancellation of the NIR and ID cards.

“Over the last year we have seen far too many careless and inexcusable breaches of people’s personal information. The roll call of banks, retailers, government departments, public bodies and other organisations which have admitted serious security lapses is frankly horrifying.

Whatever you scumbag. What is FAR MORE HORRIFYING are the numerous breaches of GOVERNMENT DATABASES (the ones that we know about) where insiders have leaked information, violated privacy, and just been plain incompetent; we have documented and dissected some of these on BOOGDIAL of course.

Wrong hands

“How can laptops holding details of customer accounts be used away from the office without strong encryption? How can millions of store cards fall into the wrong hands? How can online recruitment allow applicants to see each others’ forms? How can any bank chief executive face customers and shareholders and admit that loan rejections, health insurance applications, credit cards and bank statements can be found, unsecured in non-confidential waste bags?”

Mr Thomas, who was speaking before the publication of the commission’s annual report today, signed a deal with the banks last year that effectively gives him access to inspect and audit their systems without permission. He extracted the concession after a series of high-profile breaches at prominent high street banks and building societies.

This is utterly outrageous. This man has no business going into a private company and auditing their security (which means of course, looking at all the accounts, finding out where the back doors are, so that even ‘security through obscurity‘ will not work). Anyone who knows about the systems used by banks understands that they are hugely complex, written in a variety of old and new languages; unless this Richard Thomas has expertise in these languages, and is given access to the source, he cannot possibly be able to audit the systems. Even if he did get access to the source, it would take years to audit it all, and the government does not have this expertise; that is a FACT.

That the banks have signed this agreement is also very very weird. I would like to read it….but I digress. Obviously they signed it to try and stop some new legislation coming into force. This is a bad, bullying bastard government.

In one instance, Halifax allowed details of 13,000 mortgage customers to go astray after the briefcase holding the documents was stolen froma member of staff’s car.

That has nothing to do with computers. No audit would catch this sort of insider blunder.

The incident came after Nationwide’s lax security procedures put thousands of customers at risk from fraud. A laptop was stolen from a long-standing Nationwide employee in a domestic burglary. The employee reported its loss and then went on holiday, but it took three weeks for the building society to realise that the laptop contained confidential customer information.

All this sort of event requires is the writing of guidelines, i.e., you do not put customer data on laptops. Ever.

Mr Thomas said a similar agreement allowing his inspectors access to companies in all sectors would prove to be more effective than spending the next few years painstakingly negotiating with each area of industry and commerce.

Richard Thomas is a moron. What this means is that anyone running a database (presumably over a certain number of rows in size) would be liable to one of these audits. Any company with even half a brain cell would immediately leave the UK for more sensible shores. There would be nothing that Richard Thomas and his army of ‘experts’ could do about it, and in fact, this is already happening. Banks, telephone companies (BT) have moved their data processing to India. When you get a call from an Indian call centre, they have your name, account number, date of birth, address and everything else they need to serve you.

There is nothing that Richard Thomas can do about it, and frankly that is a good thing. If Britain wants to become a business unfriendly zone, all modern businesses from LastFM to Orange will simply go elsewhere. Its all transparent to the user and the company, so why not? Why put up with these zealots and idiots and control freak morons who do not know the difference between what is public and what is private?

He said he also needed a more effective sanction where there are “flagrant, far-reaching breaches of the law”.

The ultimate sanction is a lawsuit, and customers leaving you. That is what you should facilitate. After you have cleaned up your own house.

Debt collectors linked to a financial services subsidiary of General Motors and private equity firm Cabot Square Capital were named in a court case this year over the illicit market in private information stolen from government databases.

And there you have it.

What I have been saying all along about copies of databases, illegal trading of data etc etc. and yet, this brain dead journalist cannot connect the dots and pull Richard Thomas up on the shenanigans that he is a part of, and the danger he is putting the 11 million children of Britain in.

Its is sickening, like watching an avalanche bearing down on you in slow motion as jabbering idiots throw snowballs at each other.

The commissioner brought a prosecution against a private investigator who was used by companies chasing vehicle hire purchase and bank debtors. The private investigator posed as another member of staff in telephone conversations in a practice known as “blagging” to gain access to personal information. The companies say they told the private investigator at the time not to break the law.

It is not called ‘Blagging’ you cretin, it is called ‘Social Engineering‘, and Kevin Mitnick wrote a very good book about it (which I have read) that everyone like Richard Thomas and Phillip Inmann should read. If they have read it, then double shame on them for not taking it seriously.

Mr Thomas said he was concerned that a market in stolen data was growing despite recent adverse publicity. “During a recent investigation we turned up at the offices of a private investigation agency and while we were there the fax machine leapt into life. It was a request from another firm asking them to find out if a woman had cancer. It also asked the agency to check a list of clinics to see if another woman had had an abortion.

This is astonishing. Does Richard Thomas really think that the underground market in stolen data is going to stop growing because of adverse publicity? And does he truly believe that if ContactPoint, the NIR and ID Cards are rolled out that this market will shrink?

Is he that delusional?

“In this instance we are not talking about a small misdemeanour. This is the illegal soliciting of personal information and the kind of thing that we need to investigate thoroughly.”

Bastardy mixed with ignorance. What needs to be done is to stop the compulsory aggregation of personal data into monolithic systems that are widely accessible by civil servants. That means no ContactPoint, no ID Cards and no NIR. Period.

But the CBI said enhanced powers to investigate alleged breaches of the data protection rules would have wider implications. “The nature of business is changing dramatically, so the way companies handle customer data is increasingly important,” said the employers’ body spokesman Jeremy Beale. “Some firms need to improve their data policies but there are no easy answers or silver bullets and the CBI wants a national debate to help identify where the responsibility for different aspects of data protection lies. By calling for the ability to inspect firms’ files without consent, the information commissioner is in danger of leading businesses into the very surveillance society he is heeding against.”

Exactly. And looking at files has nothing to do with laptops escaping offices or garbage being thrown out un shredded.

Mr Thomas said this year he was concerned that the vast amount of data being collected on individuals meant we were sleep-walking into a surveillance society. He said he lacked greater powers only because when the government translated the EU data protection directive into law it left out crucial elements. “The EU wants the government to give us the powers. Our experience tells us we need the powers,” he said.

Our experience, which is greater than yours simply through reading, is that:

• You people don’t know what you are doing
• You say one thing (protect data) and then do another (collect children’s details in an open system)
• You do not admit to data breaches, and take no responsibility for them
• You have no expertise in this area at all
• You have nothing of substance to offer
• You use this and every possible excuse to get into people’s private affairs

The Ministry of Justice is responsible for overseeing the Information Commissioner’s office. Yesterday it said: “We believe that the Information Commissioner already has adequate powers.”

Amen. What this dunderhead needs is TRAINING and EXPERIENCE in the systems he is trying to get to grips with, so that he can read and write best practice documents and then implement them INSIDE HER MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT.

Don’t bank on banks to keep your secrets

For consumers who have been studiously shredding their old credit card statements and other sensitive data, the information commissioner’s move cannot come soon enough.

Despite repeatedly warning their customers to be careful about what they put in the recycling bin, several banks and other institutions have shown a disregard for their customer’s important financial data.

Two years ago the Guardian exposed how the Grand hotel in Brighton – bombed during the 1984 Conservative party conference – had thrown thousands of its customers’ credit card details, home addresses, and phone numbers in a skip outside its back door. Passers-by were helping themselves. We were able to ring up some of the former guests and read out their credit card numbers – to their initial bemusement, and ultimate anger. In some cases we even had their passport numbers. And the Grand was by no means alone.

The Grand Hotel in Brighton is not a bank, last time I chequed.

Since then, banks have been caught leaving bin liners full of customers’ details out in the street. Others have allowed staff to take unprotected laptops containing sensitive data home, which have subsequently been stolen.

In the usa there are now services that lock down your stuff and make it harder for thieves to use your accounts, should they get hold of your SSN. The market responds to these challenges and people are willing to pay for them. Like I predicted, ‘Dorian Grey’ services will begin to emerge onto the markets, where your identity will be shielded for a fee. You can do all your shopping and everything else you need to do whilst using an alternative managed and disposable identity. This will be the only way to keep yourself out of the legal and illegal databases, making you freer and more flexible.

A further concern was the case last year of Abbey’s call centre staff who were selling its customers’ bank details in an underpass near Bradford. In fact, this happens far more often than is realised because the banks always hush up breaches of security.

And what about the NIR, Identity Cards and ContactPoint you simple minded numbskull pinheaded journalist loser? Did it not occur to you, with that vivid image of people sneaking around in an underpass that this is the way perverts are going to trade ContactPoint data?

Honestly!

Sri Lankan staff in petrol stations recently perpetrated a £30m chip and pin fraud after they recorded details and then cloned several customers’ bank and credit cards.

Did that happen in Sri Lanka or the UK? Why mention the country that the bad guys were from? Nasty!

The government is another culprit. In one instance, temporary staff at the Child Support Agency were allowed access to one of the country’s three main credit reference agencies. The staff could ask for credit checks on individuals and get other personal financial information. To make matters worse, they were able to continue accessing the Equifax database for several months after their contracts ended.

That was a breach of Equifax, not a breach of a government database. Anyone can pay to get access to Equifax, so this example is totally bogus and garbage.

Next week HM Revenue & Customs is expected to announce that its tax credit system suffered fraud and error worth £1bn in 2005/2006. In its first three years the level of fraud and error will reach almost £3bn.

Irrelevant. Obviously Phillip Inmann has run out of examples because he actually doesn’t know anything about this subject, and also, cannot even use the google to find relevant examples. What a complete jackass!

So you are far more likely to be the victim of identity fraud because of something an institution holding your details has done – or not done – than you are from not shredding your documents at home.

The brain dead, computer illiterate, irresponsible, useless Guardian

[…]

What a pathetic conclusion. The majority of people do not suffer identity theft. That is a fact. It is also a fact that people in the UK are less vulnerable because there is no single identifying number attached to everyone’s name as there is in the USA, with their despicable Social Security Number. Britain is better off than the USA in this respect, and idiots like you keep failing to connect the dots and point this out whenever you get the chance. Don’t worry; there are many people who are doing your job for you, who actually know what they are talking about, and in fact, they have had a bigger audience an influence than any of your lackluster articles have had.

Another post tipping point post:

[…]
Before writing me off as a privacy kook, consider this testimony from 1992 by the group Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) before the Special Joint Subcommittee Studying State and Commercial Use of Social Security Numbers for Transactional Identification. According to testimony, “[until] 1972, each card issued was emblazoned with the phrase ‘Not to be used for ID purposes.'” It cited a report by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare that recommended, in unqualified terms, that the SSN not be used as an identifier (bold text in the original document):

We recommend against the adoption of any nationwide, standard, personal identification format, with or without the SSN, that would enhance the likelihood of arbitrary or uncontrolled linkage of records about people, particularly between government or government-supported automated personal data systems.

This advice was not followed, and by 1992 the CPSR reported the dismal facts: “Unfortunately, [the Federal Privacy Act of 1974] has not been effective due to bureaucratic resistance from inside the government, lack of an effective oversight mechanism, and the uncontrolled use of the SSN in the private sector.” When states like California, New York, Virginia and others passed legislation in the mid-1990s requiring the collection of an applicant’s SSN to issue a driver’s license, they effectively flattened 60 years of privacy protection, and they effectively exposed every citizen to a degree of identity risk that was, and remains, unconscionable.

And so what has been the legacy of the government ignoring its own advice and the advice of leading computer experts? Precisely what the CPSR predicted: identity theft is now the most prevalent complaint received by the FTC, and it’s America’s fastest-growing crime. Unlike a video game that just eats your quarter and says “GAME OVER,” a stolen identity can ruin your credit score, drain your bank account, endow you with a lengthy criminal record, or grant you an entry on the no-fly list. More troubling, identity theft can be a one-way ticket to a world in which the bits on some agent’s computer screen matter more than your own testimony, a world in which the term habeas corpus is a lexical artifact rather than a constitutional guarantee, a world in which your physical self can be suborned based on what is believed about your virtual self.

On December 18, 2006, Tom Zeller reported “An Ominous Milestone: 100 Million Data Leaks” in the Technology section of The New York Times. The number of confirmed victims is at least 15 million. The cost is estimated at more than $50 billion a year. In health care terms, we have more than 100 million “exposed,” 15 million “affected,” and a cost of, well, more than $50 billion. How did we get here? And what are we going to do about this virtual epidemic?

[…]

The people of this fair isle do not have this problem, because there is no unique identifying number that is issued by the state to every citizen line the american Social Security Number (SSN).

If the NIR is rolled out as planned, then everyone in the UK will be given a unique number which will be printed on their ID card. That number will then be the same as the SSNs that plague the americans, and then the shit will hit the fan for the British.

That ID cards are still being considered is as unsurprising as it is appalling. Gordon Brown and his merry band of murderers do not care a whit about the British people, or how much danger they put them in as a result of their insane policies.

Once again, for the nth time, if you allow yourself to get put into this system, then what is happening to the americans will happen to you You would have to be TOTALLY INSANE to volunteer for this madness.

But you know this…

and finally:

[…]
And it gets worse. Individuals who can be victimized by their own data can also become collective victims of those with whom they are associated. As Bruce Schneier wrote for Wired magazine:

Contrary to decades of denials, the U.S. Census Bureau used individual records to round up Japanese-Americans during World War II.

The Census Bureau normally is prohibited by law from revealing data that could be linked to specific individuals; the law exists to encourage people to answer census questions accurately and without fear. And while the Second War Powers Act of 1942 temporarily suspended that protection in order to locate Japanese-Americans, the Census Bureau had maintained that it only provided general information about neighborhoods.

New research proves they were lying.

The whole incident serves as a poignant illustration of one of the thorniest problems of the information age: data collected for one purpose and then used for another, or “data reuse.”

It is bad enough that the government might collect data for one (lawful) purpose and then use it for another (nefarious) purpose, but what happens when all data is keyed by a single key, such as a Social Security number (SSN), which itself was never designed for the purpose of personal identification? And what happens when that number is leaked (100 million instances and counting) or stolen (15 million instances and counting)? The opportunities for abuse, both within and outside the system become virtually limitless. (And legislation passed in 2005 has only served to accelerate both the breadth and depth of these opportunities.)

Which is why the iPhone activation mechanism is so troubling, because it compels people in the heat of the moment to do something they should never do if given a moment’s thought. Now, I’m sure that it’s possible to get a phone activated without giving up one’s SSN. I did it with my carrier several years ago by walking the issue up to a VP’s desk and posting a $1,000 bond for two years. So it can be done. But should it be so hard? And how are we going to teach our children the importance of protecting personal information when the laws of the state and mainstream corporate behavior make it virtually impossible to do so?

The only solution I can see is that our family will have to dramatically expand the lesson of “you are responsible for you” beyond the basics of verbal and physical conduct. If you have any good references on how to teach your third-grader the ins and outs of identity management and information security, I’d be happy to receive them now. In the meantime, we’ll let you know whether we find a way to activate Amy’s new iPhone without handing over sensitive personal information to a company that has demonstrated no respect for personal privacy or identifying data.

[…]

News.com

What is so magical about this great country is that none of this applies here and we still have time to stop it from happening. Britain is still great. It is not to late to pull her back from the brink of the abyss.

Ah yes, the second use of our new category ‘Someone Stupid Said’, and a most perfect example to boot.

Beverley Hughes, Minister of State for Children, Young People and Families, and soon to be the orchestrator of the largest mass abuse of children in the history of the world, said some very stupid stuff in a letter printed in the Guardian, in response to this letter authored by Jonathan Shephard (Independent Schools Council), Ross Anderson (Foundation Information Policy Research), Simon Davies (Privacy International), Becky Hogge (Open Rights Group) and Terri Dowty (Action on Rights for Children).

Here we go…

The ContactPoint system is secure

Tuesday June 26, 2007
The Guardian

Those who claim ContactPoint is open to abuse (Letters, June 22) should look more closely at the systems.

Actually we understand PERFECTLY how databases work, which is why we are able to make the assessment that ContactPoint cannot ever be secure. It is YOU who are a computer illiterate schaufensterpuppen without a single clue about what you are talking about or allowing to be planned.

If you publish the actual specification, then everyone can make a judgement, except maybe you, since you clearly don’t know the difference between a television and a computer.

The design and operation of ContactPoint will adhere to the new international standard for information security management systems as well as conforming with relevant government security standards and will continue to be reviewed by independent security experts during the system build.

So. What you failed to do is provide a link to to or properly name (give the ISO number) for this standard. Do you even know what a link is, we ask. As for ‘conforming to the relevant govenment security standards’, we have seen how they work and they do not work at all. Those standards are actually implimented (and very probably designed) by the contractors that you use to get these revolting jobs done. No department in the government has the capacity to be able to design and run these systems, and even if they did, this does not address the issue of rogue workers releasing information.

You say that security will be reviewed ‘during the system build’. What this REALLY means is that you have no idea how it is going to be rolled out and secured in advance of doing it, and you will be making it up as you go along, fixing any problems as you build it.

This is like saying you are going to build a new model of passenger jet, and that you are going to work out the details like center of gravity, air flow, where to place the engines, seating arrangements, materials, avionics etc etc during the aircraft build. You really are, one of the stupidest people on the planet if you are going to do what you are planning to do in the way that you have described in this pathetic letter.

We are confident we are doing all we can to ensure security.

And it is this suicidal overconfidence that will be the undoing of this project.

It is true that, in some limited situations, records of children whose circumstances may mean they are at increased risk of harm may be subject to shielding.

What this means is very clear. ALL CHILDREN SHOULD NOT BE PUT IN THIS DATABASE. A paedophile values ALL children. This is not a limited situation, but something that makes ALL children vulnerable. We know that the children of celebrities (and no doubt, the children of very member of Parliament) are going to be exempted from this database. The fact is that YOUR children are not more special, valuable or worthy of protection than any other child.

This admission is not only wrong, but it is a sickening demonstration of your true nature, as exposed by those hypocritical ministers who say that the state school system is good enough for everyone while they segregate their own children into private schools because their local schools are actually totally unacceptable, (Ruth Kelly, Diane Abbott, Harriet Harman). No one’s child should be put in this database by force. Every parent should have the right to opt IN to it should they want to. Opting in is the only correct and moral way to run such an abomination, and of course, you will never do this, because no one in their right mind would deliberately add their children to yet another government database.

These decisions will be taken on a case-by-case basis and this approach was backed by the information commissioner. The information commissioner’s office has been consulted at every stage of the development of the procedures surrounding the use of ContactPoint.

The foxes consulted with each other about access to the chicken coop. We feel so much better now!

Access to the system will be restricted to authorised workers who need it as part of their job and who have been security-checked, trained and have the necessary authentication

You really are one disingenuous liar of the first order.

The ‘authorized worker’ you desctibe are actually an army of 330,000 people. That is not ‘restricting’ the system, that is giving it to every Tom Dick and Harry.

The ‘security checking’ will not stop anyone of this army of users from copying and compromising the security of children on the database. If you knew anything about databases and how they are used you would understand this. If you claim to understand this, then you are an evil monster for pushing ContactPoint, and a liar because you are claiming that ‘ContactPoint is Secure’ when you know that this can never be the case. If you do not know anything about this, you should, at the very least, not have written this letter, and you should not be trying to rollout this disaster on wheels. Either way, you are in the wrong.

they will be made aware of the penalties for misuse, including disciplinary and criminal proceedings.

None of these penalties will reverse the damage done by this system. Period.

ContactPoint will contain only basic administrative information about children in England – their name, date of birth, and contact details for their parents or carers, for their school, GP and other services working with the child or young person. There will be no case information and no subjective opinions about a child or parent.

This is more disingenuous garbage. The private, sensitive and personal details of human beings (who they are related to, where they live, their ages) are not ‘basic administrative information’. This is PRIVATE INFORMATION that is the property of the citizen, and you have no right to store it, abuse it, collect it, distribute it or do anything with it without the written consent of the person. Certainly you have absolutely no right to short circuit the responsibility of a parent to their children by stealing this information and using it willy nilly. You are evil for doing this, you are evil for thinking this, and there are no two ways about it.

You are demonstrating that you are anti family, by doing this, coming between the sacred relationship that exists in a family between the child and the parent. These details are private. They should remain private, and they should only be used by consent.

It’s important not to forget the reason we are bringing this system in. It implements an important recommendation made by Lord Laming and is designed to be a practical tool to support better communication between practitioners so they can see quickly and easily who else is working with the same child and how they can contact them.
Beverley Hughes
Minister of State for Children, Young People and Families

This is utter nonsense. The fact is you don’t know why this database is being proposed. You have not got a clue about the forceful vendors pushing their ‘solutions’ onto HMG and the public, the dirty deals to sell the population like sheep. You have no idea about the long term agenda to neutralize any opposition to the creation of the Quantized Human Pleb Grid. Once again, if you DO know about all of this, you are completely evil for promoting it. If you do not, then you should not be promoting it from a place of total pig ignorance.

Beverley Hughes is the anti-Family minister. She has no idea of what the word ‘Family’ means; anyone that claims they know what that word means could never propose what she is proposing. Anyone that is pro-Family is for the protection and preservation of family bonds and responsibilities and they do not, reflexively, do anything that dilutes those bonds and responsibilities.

What Beverley Hughes is proposing is not only wrong, it is very dangerous. But she doesn’t care.

Look at her record:

How Beverley Hughes voted on key issues since 2001:

• Moderately against a transparent Parliament.
  votes,speeches

• Moderately for introducing a smoking ban.
  votes,speeches

• Strongly for introducing ID cards.
  votes,speeches

• Very strongly for introducing foundation hospitals.
  votes,speeches

• Strongly for introducing student top-up fees.
  votes,speeches

• Strongly for Labour’s anti-terrorism laws.
  votes,speeches

• Very strongly for the Iraq war.
  votes,speeches

• Very strongly against investigating the Iraq war.
  votes,speeches

• Very strongly for replacing Trident.
  votes,speeches

• Very strongly for the fox hunting ban.
  votes,speeches

From this record it is clear that Beverley Hughes is against everything decent people are for. The only reason why she is there is because 7,851 couldn’t tell night from day at the ballot box.

That she is in this particular job is astonishing and frightening….though not really surprising, all of Neu Labour are as mad as hatters, and the deeper you go the more cut off from reality they are.

By Sharon Gaudin InformationWeek July 3, 2007

A senior level database administrator for ContactPoint is being accused of stealing and selling sensitive information on 2.3 million British children.

The now former employee whose name was not released allegedly took the information and sold it to a data broker, who in turn sold the information to several direct marketing companies, according to a press release posted by Capita, which is the company that won the contract to operate ContactPoint.

“As a result of this apparent theft, the children and families affected are received marketing solicitations from the companies that bought the data,” said Renz Nichols, president of Capita, in a written statement. “We have no reason to believe that the theft resulted in any paedophiles getting hold of children, and we are taking the necessary steps to see that any further use of the data stops.”

Capita noted its researchers believe that about 2.3 million children have been compromised, with approximately 2.2 million containing health information and 990,000 containing other sensitive information on the parents. They’re still investigating when the alleged theft occurred.

The database administrator who worked on ContactPoint had access to the information as part of his job responsibilities but did not have the authority to actually remove any of the information, according to Capita. The administrator has been fired and Capita filed a civil complaint in the High Court against him and the marketing companies that bought the information. Capita reported that it is seeking the return of all the consumer information, as well as an injunction against its use.

The company also said in the release that it is pushing authorities to file criminal charges.

Capita, which runs many government IT services, including the London Congestion Charge, maintains bank account information to help merchants decide whether to accept checks as payment. The company also maintains check and credit card information in connection with its other operations that are designed to help businesses provide customers with access to funds.

Capita said a parent reported suspicious solicitations and marketing materials. An investigation found that the company’s security systems had not been breached, so they called in the U.S. Secret Service, since the British Government has no expertise in this area, who often investigate financial crimes. The Secret Service, according to Capita, then traced the leak back to the database administrator.

Information Week

[…]

And there you have it.

There are some interesting lines in this story:

“…we are taking the necessary steps to see that any further use of the data stops.”

Just how are they going to know if the data was not sold on again? They cannot know this, and if the data is partitioned into small stripped parcels, whoever bought a stripped parcel will have plausible deniability. There are many data brokers out there who sell data aggregated from many sources. All they have to do is strip out all the data that makes the stolen database identifiable as ContactPoint data (the unique numbers and everything else, leaving just the names and addresses) and then they can add this data to their current databases and claim that what they have is simply what they were using previously. Lets say you choose to buy only the subset of ContactPoint where the children are exactly seven years old. You would be able to send a mailout to these families without raising too much suspicion.

The bottom line is, data in a huge database is like pandora’s box; once you open it and let it out, its out there forever.

“The administrator has been fired and Capita filed a civil complaint in the High Court against him and the marketing companies that bought the information.”

Firing the administrator, hanging drawing and quartering him and then feeding the remains to pigs will not put humpty dumpty together again. No penalty, not matter how severe can erase all the illegal copies taken from a database. That sort of magic is just that, magic and not part of the real world.

The only way to prevent theft like this is to not put the sensitive information of private people in a database in the first place.

“Capita reported that it is seeking the return of all the consumer information, as well as an injunction against its use.”

This is so absurd it beggars belief that they have the gall to say it in public, let alone in writing.

If ContactPoint is rolled out, it will be the single greatest threat ever foisted upon the children of a country. Never before will a government have deliberately put so many children in danger in a single stroke. It is an act of monstrous stupidity and evil. Period.

James Meikle
Friday June 22, 2007
The Guardian

Misuse of an electronic database holding sensitive information on 11 million children in England could lead to millions of breaches of security each year, it is claimed today. Privacy campaigners and independent schools have warned of the “enormous” potential for abuse of the huge IT system to be launched next year.

In a letter to the Guardian, they appeal to the government to reconsider “this hugely expensive and intrusive scheme”. The Guardian revealed on Monday how the system would be open to at least 330,000 people as part of an effort to prevent deaths such as that of Victoria Climbié by helping children’s services work together.

Critics fear it will breach the right to privacy and are concerned about security. It will be accessible through the internet with a two-part authentication.

But today’s letter, signed by representatives of the Independent Schools Council, Action on Rights for Children, the Foundation for Information Policy Research, the Open Rights Group and Privacy International, says that the problems of “a potentially leaky and inadequate system” must be solved before the plan goes further. It claims that evidence from Leeds NHS trust last year suggested that in one month staff logged 70,000 incidents of inappropriate access. “On the basis of these figures, misuse of the ContactPoint system could run to 1,650,000 incidents a month.”

[…]

The computer illiterate Guardian

My emphasis.

Firstly, these moronic journalists have no idea about how to tell these stories because they are computer illiterates. Only a computer illiterate would use a phrase like ‘two-part authentication’ in this context. The correct phrase is:

‘only a user name and password’

When you use the correct phrase, it is then easy to paint a picture of people sharing usernames and passwords to gain entry into this system, which will be live over the internets.

This means that anyone with the url, a leaked username and password and the intent, can get onto the system, and then start to copy the entries one by one.

In fact, a smart person could write a simple PHP script to scrape the entries one by one over a long period of time, prompting the user for an alternative username and password should the one he is supplied with cease to be useful.

Everyone knows about Bugmenot, the service that supplies you with usernames and passwords to many sites on the internets. I’m sure that the Bugmenot Admins would NEVER allow usernames and passwords to ContactPoint on their system, but what Bugmenot demonstrates is that it is easy to not only share usernames and passwords, but it is possible to automate the sharing of these usernames and passwords.

Of course, none of this is in this article. It is not vivid in even the most simple area, that of using the correct terminology, which everyone is familiar with since most people in the UK have some contact with internet accounts and logging into them with a user name and a password.

Even that journalist must have experience of logging into his email account; how is it that these people cannot make the insight jump to the next logical point in the argument against this?

Because they are THICK AS SHIT.

330,000 users to have access to database on England’s children

• Family campaigners raise concerns over security
• Index is intended to avoid another Climbié case

Lucy Ward, social affairs correspondent
Monday June 18, 2007
The Guardian

A giant electronic database containing sensitive information on all 11 million children in England will be open to at least 330,000 users when it launches next year, according to government guidance.

A final consultation on the plan reveals that the index, intended to help children’s services work together more effectively following the death of Victoria Climbié, will be accessible through any computer linked to the internet, whether at work or at home, providing users have the correct two-part security authentication.

Guidance on the £224m project warns those authorised to use the system not to access it in internet cafes or on computers in public reception areas, and instructs them never to leave the database logged on in case of unauthorised use.

Though it stresses the sophistication of the electronic security surrounding the databank, it acknowledges: “No system can be 100% guaranteed against misuse.” The government was warned by family campaigners that parents would be concerned about the number of people able to search the database, and about the potential security risk.

Mary MacLeod, chief executive of the Family and Parenting Institute, said: “Our research with parents suggests they will have great anxiety about the proposals.”

The universal database, forecast to cost £41m a year to run, has prompted controversy since the government set out its legal underpinning in the 2004 Children Act. Ministers argue the system will help prevent the lack of communication between children’s services revealed in the Laming inquiry into the death of eight-year-old Victoria Climbié, and will boost early intervention where children need it.

However, critics argue it breaches a child’s right to privacy, while others have raised concerns about security.

The database, named ContactPoint, will store basic identifying information including date of birth, address, name of parent and an identifying number for each child up to the age of 18. It will also hold contact details for services involved with the child, including school and GP practice but also others, though consent is required for details of sensitive services such as sexual and mental health.

No one will be allowed to opt out of the database, but children or their parents will have the right to ask to see information about them and challenge it if it is wrong. Children’s details can also be electronically “shielded” if they are considered to be at increased risk – an exemption which, controversially, could extend to the offspring of high-profile figures.

[…]

http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,2105187,00.html

Every Child Matters, but it seems, some children matter more than others.

The right to CHALLENGE information if it is wrong is completely different to being able to CHANGE information if it is wrong, and if this insanity goes ahead, you can imagine the horrible process that would be involved in any such ‘challenge’.

And of course, they will use these unique numbers and roll them over into the NIR, creating a system that automatically populates it from birth from now (2008, if they manage to create this database) on.

This is pure evil, and the fact that they are going to ‘shield’ the identities of the children of the rich and famous proves that this database is dangerous to every child.

From the policy document:

Objectives of ContactPoint

4. The objectives of ContactPoint are to:
• help practitioners identify quickly a child with whom they have contact, and whether that child is getting the universal services (education, primary health care) to which he or she is entitled;

and then:

Which children and young people will be covered?

9. ContactPoint also supports the policy objective of identifying early those children with additional needs which should be addressed if they are to achieve the Every Child Matters outcomes, and then addressing those needs swiftly and effectively. It is estimated that at any one time 3-4 million children have such needs.

10. ContactPoint will cover all children and young people in England.
This is because:
• it is not possible to predict in advance which children will have needs for additional services;
• any child or young person could require the support of those services at any time in their childhood; and
• all children have the right to the universal services (education, primary health care), and the basic data will show whether or not they are receiving, and will then, as necessary, support local action to ensure they do receive them.

What this says is very clear; every child has the right to education, and this system will make sure that they will be forced to receive these ‘rights’.

If it is shown that a child is not receiving the ‘right’ to go to school, then the system will flag them, and the ‘right’ to attend school will be enforced.

Note how they justify putting EVERY CHILD in the system because, “it is not possible to predict in advance which children will have needs for additional services”, in other words, every parent is a potential criminal, and every child is a potential victim, and so we must put everyone under surveillance.

They understand that people do not like to be surveilled:

In order to ensure universal coverage, and also to ensure that the most vulnerable children have a record, inclusion of a child or young person on ContactPoint will not be subject to consent. However, where a practitioner is delivering a sensitive service to a child or young person, inclusion of that practitioner’s contact details on the child’s record will be subject to the informed and explicit consent of the young person, or, in the case of a child, the parent. Access to this information, once placed on the child’s record, will also be tightly restricted. Sensitive services are specific services in the fields of sexual health, mental health, and substance abuse. The purpose of this approach is to prevent children and young people being deterred from accessing these services.

Once everyone with a sensitive medical problem understands that touching this system in any way marks you forever, they WILL stay away from it, becauase they will understand that anyone can find out everything about them. And this will be carried over into adulthood:

ContactPoint will cover children and young people up to their 18th birthday. To help ensure that the transition from youth to adult services is managed smoothly, it may also be desirable to make provision to retain some basic information for young adults with multiple needs, (for example care leavers and young people with disabilities), beyond their 18th birthday, with their consent.

So, your consent to be kept on this database can be asked if you are 18; does this mean that the records pertaining to each child as it reaches its 18th year will be deleted?. Also, why is it that parents cannot opt out of this system on behalf of their children, but children themselves can do so when they reach 18? If it is good for you when you are less than 18, surely it is good for you after you are 18; why should you be given the choice to opt out then, and not before?

Parents have the absolute right to care for their children in the way that they see fit. By saying that the parent does not have the right to opt their children out, the state is taking on the role of the parent in saying what is and is not of benefit to the child which is totally unacceptable to any decent person. They are making the children of the UK into property.

Parents have an obligation to protect their children from harm. This database constitutes real harm, and so, all parents who object to it, should opt out of it by any means necessary.

People with money (people with means) will now have to find private doctors who use only paper to keep records, and who are true to their Hippocratic Oath. This database violates the privacy of children, puts them in harms way, damages them and their families and so therefore, all doctors should refuse to engage with it in any way.

And the people without money? I guess they will just have to vote Tory next time round.

How are they going to populate this database?

To avoid double-inputting of data and to ensure high standards of accuracy, information will be drawn from and updated through, a range of existing national and local systems, using proven technology.

This means that it is going to be a total mess. Which is a good thing, because if it does not work, eventually it will be shut down as non cost effective.

And what if people abuse the system? (other than the hackers who will be able to own this system within 15 minutes of it going live)

A range of sanctions are available to manage inappropriate use, and can include disciplinary action, fines and custodial sentences.

Of course, none of these sanctions will put the data back in the database. Once it is out there, it is out there forever, and no amount of prison time, fines, disciplinary action or any thing else will change that.

This shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of data, and it also shows a lack of understanding of the risk such a system poses.

By assembling this system, they are putting ALL THE CHILDREN OF THE UK AT RISK because a statistically small number of children are being mistreated. By creating this system, they are abusing ALL THE CHILDREN OF THE UK, where they were not before being abused and violated.

This government has, through this project, become the single biggest abuser of children in the history of Great Britain.

And finally:

18.

During the implementation phase, each Local Authority will be funded to provide a small team to support data migration, matching and cleansing during roll-out. There will also be a role for authorities to communicate and consult widely in their areas and to locally promote ContactPoint. Each Authority will maintain a small team to support ongoing data migration, matching and cleansing, and technical support for authorised users. This team would be responsible for service management, systems administration, data management, professional support and administration of local access. Local authorities will be supported by the central project team through this process, and will receive training, guidance and support to carry out this important role.

So there will be hoards of people given access to this database as it is being created, who will sift and sort through everyone, looking through everyones personal details as they ‘match and cleanse’. This is a total nightmare.

LEts think about some security breach scenarios, many of which we have discussed on BLOGDIAL before:

Casually shared login details:
We all know about the sharing of logins and passwords that is rampant throughout many systems world wide. All it will take is one person to allow their account to be used for the entire system to be compromised, and of course, once the data is out there, it is out there FOREVER.

Hackers Owning the DB:
I guarantee you that some hackers will own this database within minutes or days of it going online. They will then do an SQL dump of the whole database, and then all of it, records of every child in the UK will be out there, FOREVER. This is a scenario that WILL take place.

Duplication by increments:
This database and its entire contents will be duplicated over time, as every small breach and copying of a record means that particular record is out there forever. Over 10 years (if this nightmare goes ahead) we will see near complete copies of this database in private hands.

This database is not only extremely valuable to sex monsters, but it is literally millions of times more valuable to toy, clothes and book manufacturers who would pay anything (even fines and jail time) for access to the clean database of names ages, genders and addresses of all the children in the UK, so that they can market to them directly and individually. This database represents a business opportunity without precedent. And you can guarantee that the selling of it will be proposed as a way to offset the cost of running it.

Bad insiders:
Bad insiders; we have talked about them on BLOGDIAL before, and there is nothing that you can do about them. No amount of ‘enhanced criminal records checks’ will be able to predict which of these 330,000 people will crack under pressure. Criminal records checks only tell you the people who have not yet committed a crime, they cannot predict the future.

This government is totally insane to be doing this. No doubt about it.

The ultimate question for all parents is, what are you going to do to protect your children and to keep them out of this database? How far are you willing to go to do it?